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THE WISCONSIN CONSUMER ACT:  
WHEN IS A TRANSACTION A CONSUMER 
CREDIT TRANSACTION? 
RALPH C. ANZIVINO* 
The Wisconsin Consumer Act applies to all consumer credit transactions.  
A consumer credit transaction is a defined term under the Wisconsin 
Consumer Act.  It has six essential elements that have been carefully 
interpreted by Wisconsin courts.  First, the transaction must be a 
consumer transaction that can be a cash or credit transaction.  Second, the 
transaction must involve a consumer that is contracting for property, 
services, or credit for personal, family, or household purposes.  Third, the 
transaction must be between a customer and a merchant.  The Wisconsin 
Consumer Act definition of a merchant is significantly different than the 
UCC definition of a merchant.  Fourth, the subject matter of the 
transaction must be real or personal property, services, or money.  The 
definitions and interpretations of personal property and services subject to 
the Wisconsin Consumer Act are so broad as to be nearly limitless.  Fifth, 
the transaction must involve a grant of credit by the merchant to the 
customer.  Significant litigation has evolved over the meaning of that 
phrase.  Sixth, the contract between the merchant and the customer must 
either permit the customer to pay in installments or permit the merchant to 
charge a finance charge.  There are a number of factors that courts 
consider in determining whether the parties’ contract permits the customer 
to pay in installments.  Although “finance charge” is a defined term, the 
courts have struggled when distinguishing a finance charge from an 
additional charge or a late payment fee. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
For over forty years, the Wisconsin Consumer Act (WCA or “the 
Act”) has regulated transactions between consumers and merchants.1  
The WCA consists of seven chapters in the Wisconsin Statutes.2  At its 
heart, the Act has two primary purposes—(1) to require merchants to 
supply certain disclosures to consumers3 and (2) to regulate merchant 
debt collection conduct.4  A merchant’s failure to comply with the many 
disclosure requirements, or violate any of the numerous collection 
limitations, will result in a violation of the Act and a coincidental 
judgment against the merchant.5  A violation of the Act can lead to 
severe consequences, which include paying the debtor’s attorneys’ fees; 
forgiving the balance due on the debt; reimbursing the debtor for all 
monies paid to the merchant; and permitting the debtor to keep the 
contracted-for item free of charge.6  Whether a transaction is subject to 
the WCA is a critical determination for both the debtor’s attorney and 
the merchant’s attorney.  As one might suspect, the consumer’s attorney 
is claiming the Act does apply, while the merchant’s attorney asserts the 
Act does not apply.7  Normally, neither attorney is involved in the initial 
transaction between the consumer and merchant, but the issue comes to 
a boil when collection activity is initiated. 
There are two prerequisites that must be satisfied before a 
transaction is subject to the WCA.  The first is whether the transaction is 
the type of transaction between the consumer and merchant that causes 
it to be subject to the Act, and the second is a territorial requirement.8  
The territorial requirement will be addressed in a subsequent article.9  
Territorial issues aside, any transaction that qualifies as a consumer 
credit transaction is subject to all of the chapters of the WCA.10  There 
 
1. 1971 Wis. Act 239; see also WIS. STAT. § 421.102(2) (2009–2010) (providing the 
underlying purposes and policies under the WCA). 
2. See WIS. STAT. §§ 421–427. 
3. See id. § 422.301–.310.  
4. See id. § 427.104. 
5. See, e.g., id. §§ 422.201(13), 423.302, 424.203(5). 
6. See id.  § 425.302–.305, .308. 
7. See generally discussion infra Part II. 
8. WIS. STAT. § 421.201. 
9. Ralph C. Anzivino, The Wisconsin Consumer Act: Territorial Considerations?, 96 
MARQ. L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 2013). 
10. See WIS. STAT. §§ 421.201(1), 422.102, 423.201(1)(b), 424.102, 425.102, 426.102(2), 
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are six elements to a consumer credit transaction, and all must be 
satisfied to be subject to the Act.11  This article will analyze each of the 
six elements of a consumer credit transaction. 
II. CONSUMER CREDIT TRANSACTION 
If a transaction is classified as a consumer credit transaction, 
essentially all of the chapters of the WCA will apply to the transaction.12  
A consumer credit transaction is a 
[A] consumer transaction between a [B] merchant and a [C] 
customer in which [D] real or personal property, services or 
money is acquired [E] on credit and the customer’s obligation is 
[F] payable in installments or for which credit a finance charge is 
or may be imposed, whether such transaction is pursuant to an 
open–end credit plan or is a transaction involving other than 
open-end credit.13 
A consumer credit transaction “includes consumer credit sales, 
consumer loans, consumer leases and transactions pursuant to open-end 
credit plans.”14  There are numerous factors that must be established to 
qualify a transaction as a consumer credit transaction, and each factor 
will be analyzed separately.15  The first requirement is that the 
transaction must be a consumer transaction.16 
A. Consumer Transaction 
The first element of a consumer credit transaction is that the 
transaction must be a consumer transaction.17  A consumer transaction is 
“a transaction in which one or more of the parties is a customer for 
 
427.102.  Section 423.201(1)(b) of the Wisconsin Statutes applies if credit is extended.  Id. 
§ 423.201(1)(b).  Because the first element of a consumer credit transaction requires a 
consumer transaction, id. § 421.301(10), any Chapter that applies to a “consumer transaction” 
must also apply to a consumer credit transaction. 
11. WIS. STAT. § 421.301(10). 
12. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.  
13. WIS. STAT. § 421.301(10) (emphasis added). 
14. Id. (emphasis added).  Consumer credit sales, consumer loans, consumer leases, and 
transactions pursuant to open-end credit plans will be analyzed in a subsequent article. 
15. See discussion infra Parts II.A–F. 
16. See WIS. STAT. § 421.301(10). 
17. See id. 
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purposes of that transaction.”18  No credit is required, so a cash 
transaction can be a consumer transaction.19  For example, where an 
individual purchased an automobile from an auto dealer, the court 
found a consumer transaction, regardless of whether the purchase was 
made by cash or credit.20  
There are two critical components in establishing a consumer 
transaction:21 First, one must be a customer; and second, there must be a 
transaction.22  A transaction is simply “an agreement between [two] or 
more persons, whether or not . . . enforceable . . . and includes the 
making of and the performance pursuant to that agreement.”23  
Generally, the parties’ dispute is not about whether there was an 
agreement, but rather about the terms of the agreement.24  Most 
litigation, however, stems from the issue of whether one is a customer.25 
B. Customer 
Whether one qualifies as a customer under the WCA is an element 
in determining whether the transaction is a consumer transaction and 
also a consumer credit transaction.26  In other words, one must be a 
customer in both types of transactions.27  A customer is an individual, 
not an organization, “who seeks or acquires real or personal property, 
services, money or credit for personal, family or household purposes.”28  
The WCA also includes an agricultural purpose in the definition of 
 
18. Id. § 421.301(13). 
19. See id. § 421.301(13), .301(17). 
20. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Ford Motor Co., 225 Wis. 2d 305, 311–12, 313 n.2, 
592 N.W.2d 201, 204 n.2 (1999) (finding that the transaction at issue was a consumer 
transaction; however, neither party was arguing that the transaction in the case was not a 
consumer transaction). 
21. See WIS. STAT. § 421.301(13). 
22. See id. 
23. Id. § 421.301(44). 
24. See discussion infra Parts II.B–F. 
25. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
26. See WIS. STAT. § 421.301(10), .301(13). 
27. See id. 
28. Id. § 421.301(17); see, e.g., Hartman v. Meridian Fin. Servs., Inc., 191 F. Supp. 2d 
1031, 1048–49 (W.D. Wis. 2002) (finding that there was sufficient evidence that the timeshare 
interest purchases at issue were “consumer transactions” and that the plaintiffs were 
“customers” under the WCA); Seidling v. Roedl, No. 2009AP107, 2009 WL 4912570, at *1 
(Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2009) (citing WIS. STAT. § 422.301(17)) (“The Roedls qualify as 
‘customers’ because they contracted to acquire real property for personal purposes.”). 
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customer, but that is expressly limited to coverage under the debt 
collection chapter (Chapter 427 of the Wisconsin Statutes).29  Despite 
the statute’s clear limitation on coverage for agricultural purposes, some 
courts have used the agricultural purpose to construe one as a consumer 
for more than just the debt collection chapter.30 
The customer carries the burden of proof to establish that the 
transaction was for personal, family, or household purposes.31  An 
affidavit can be used to establish the customer’s purpose.32  Real 
property, personal property, services, money, or credit is considered 
used for personal, family, or household purposes if it is used 50% or 
more for that purpose.33  If an individual plaintiff is unable to satisfy the 
50% rule, the plaintiff will not be a customer under the WCA.34  For 
example, where an individual incurs credit to operate his business, that 
individual is not a customer under the WCA.35  Similarly, where a buyer 
 
29. WIS. STAT. § 421.301(17); see also State v. Ralph Hamel Forest Prods., Inc., 110 Wis. 
2d 352, 354–55, 328 N.W.2d 884, 886 (Ct. App. 1982) (finding that “agriculture includes 
forestry”). 
30. See Grand River Coop. v. Terbeest, 145 Wis. 2d 173, 175, 178, 426 N.W.2d 68, 69–70 
(Ct. App. 1988) (finding that a contract between the appellant and an agricultural cooperative 
caused the appellant to be a “customer” for purposes of Section 422.305(1) of the Wisconsin 
Statutes); see also Ixonia State Bank v. Ingersoll (In re Ingersoll), 8 B.R. 912, 916 (Bankr. 
W.D. Wis. 1981) (finding that Ingersoll’s agreement with respect to a farm caused Ingersoll to 
be a customer for purposes of Chapter 425 of the Wisconsin Statutes).  But see Ehle v. Detlor, 
No. 98-0806, 1998 Wisc. App. LEXIS 985, at *11–12 (Aug. 27, 1998) (buyer’s wholesale 
purchase of trees did not fall within “personal, family, household or agricultural purposes”). 
31. See Heath v. Avco Fin. Servs. of Wis., Inc., No. 97-3836, 1998 WL 710606, at *4 (Wis. 
Ct. App. Oct. 13, 1998) (noting that the consumer who claims the WCA violation carries the 
burden of proof of the violation); Ehle, 1998 Wisc. App. LEXIS 985, at *11–12 (denying 
venue change where a consumer claimed a particular venue due to the “consumer 
transaction”). 
32. See Hartman, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 1048–49 (finding that affidavits submitted averring 
that purchasing interest in timeshare condominiums was for personal, family, or household—
not business—use constituted sufficient evidence to determine plaintiffs’ purpose). 
33. WIS. ADMIN. CODE DFI-WCA § 1.06 (2007).  
34. See id. 
35. See Waukesha State Bank v. Bell, No. 84-1393, 1985 Wisc. App. LEXIS 3318, at *5 
(May 15, 1985) (holding that where the defendant acquired credit from the bank for business 
purposes—despite the fact that his home was used as collateral—there was no consumer 
credit transaction); see also N. Cent. Forklift, Inc. v. Brownson, No. 99-2331-FT, 2000 WL 
665729, at *3 (Wis. Ct. App. May 23, 2000) (noting that in an installment purchase agreement 
between the manufacturer and a construction company for a skidsteer, the WCA may apply 
where commercial parties agree to treat the transaction as being under the WCA); Horst 
Distrib., Inc. v. Timm, No. 78-081, 1979 WL 30580, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. July 27, 1979) 
(holding, in a dispute between a snowmobile distributor and its dealer, that the dealer was not 
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made a bulk purchase of trees for planting on his property but did not 
establish the purpose of his purchase, the buyer was not considered a 
customer.36  On the other hand, in Zehetner v. Chrysler Financial Co.,37 
the plaintiff cosigned various documents to assist her fiancé in 
purchasing an automobile, but she never signed the retail installment 
contract.38  Chrysler argued that because the plaintiff never signed the 
contract of sale she did not qualify as a customer and thus had no 
standing to sue under the WCA.39  The court disagreed.40  The court 
reasoned that one could be a customer if one simply seeks credit or 
personal property.41  The court held that in light of the plaintiff and her 
fiancé’s relationship, “their connection through their child, their 
apparent intention to marry and the need for support of the child,” the 
plaintiff was “arguably seeking both personal property and credit for 
‘personal, family or household purposes.’”42  As such, the plaintiff was a 
customer under the WCA.43 
In making the determination whether a transaction satisfies the 50% 
rule, courts examine the total circumstances surrounding the contracted-
for property or services.44  Most often, the final determination involves 
weighing a number of conflicting factors.45  Merchants should be wary of 
concluding the transaction is not subject to the WCA simply because the 
contract provides that the transaction is for a business purpose.  For 
instance, in Seeger v. AFNI, Inc.,46 the plaintiff entered into a contract 
for cell phone service.47  Thereafter, the plaintiff sued AFNI—who had 
purchased the account from Cingular48—and claimed that AFNI 
 
a customer under the Act except if he had agreed to be governed under the WCA). 
36. See Ehle, 1998 Wisc. App. LEXIS 985, at *11–12. 
37. Zehetner v. Chrysler Fin. Co., 2004 WI App 80, 272 Wis. 2d 628, 679 N.W.2d 919.  
38. Id. ¶¶ 2–5 (discussing documents that the plaintiff signed). 
39. Id. ¶ 10. 
40. See id. ¶ 21 (holding that plaintiff was a “customer” under the WCA). 
41. Id. ¶ 15. 
42. Id. ¶ 16. 
43. See id. ¶ 15. 
44. See, e.g., Seeger v. AFNI, Inc., No. 05-C-714, 2007 WL 1598618, at *7–8 (E.D. 
Wis. June 1, 2007); Duston v. Badger Lease, No. 93-1402, 1994 WL 51638, at *2 (Wis. Ct. 
App. Feb. 22, 1994). 
45. See Seeger, 2007 WL 1598618, at *7–8; Duston, 1994 WL 51638, at *2. 
46. Seeger, 2007 WL 1598618. 
47. Id. at *1. 
48. Id. at *2. 
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committed various WCA violations.49  AFNI defended on the ground 
that the plaintiff was not a customer under the WCA.50  During 
deposition, the plaintiff admitted that he entered into the cell phone 
contract primarily for business purposes and that he used the phone 
primarily for business.51  Despite the plaintiff’s admissions, however, the 
court held that the plaintiff qualified as a customer under the WCA.52  
The court reasoned that because the contract was in the plaintiff’s 
individual name,53 the payments on the account were made with the 
plaintiff’s personal credit card, and the plaintiff’s wife used the phone 
for personal reasons—on balance—the cell phone service was found to 
be for personal, family, and household purposes.54  Similarly, in Duston 
v. Badger Lease,55 an individual leased an automobile under a lease 
captioned “Equipment Lease.”56  The lease specifically provided that the 
automobile was to be used solely in the lessee’s business.57  As a result, 
the lessor asserted that the lessee did not qualify as a customer under 
the WCA.58  The evidence indicated that at the time of execution of the 
lease, the lessee told the lessor that the she intended to use the car to 
visit her sister up north and to commute to her job but not to use the car 
in her employment.59  The evidence further showed that the address on 
the lease was the lessee’s home address, and the lease was not labeled as 
a commercial lease.60  On balance, the court concluded the lease was for 
personal, family, or household purposes despite the statement in the 
lease that it was for business purposes.61 
 
49. Id. at *5. 
50. Id. at *8. 
51. Id. at *7. 
52. Id. at *8. 
53. Id.  For another example of a court considering the fact that the contract was in the 
individual’s name see Hartman v. Meridian Fin. Servs., Inc., 191 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1049 (W.D. 
Wis. 2002) (considering fact that customers entered into contracts for timeshare interest in 
condominiums in their own, individual names). 
54. See Seeger, 2007 WL 1598618, at *8. 
55. Duston v. Badger Lease, No. 93-1402, 1994 WL 51638 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 1994). 
56. Id. at *2. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. (holding that the trial court’s finding that the lease at issue was a consumer lease 
was not clearly erroneous). 
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Where there are multiple transactions between the same parties, 
some transactions may be deemed for a business purpose and others for 
a personal purpose.62  The courts, however, have divergent approaches 
on how to distinguish a business purpose from a personal one when 
there is more than one transaction between the parties.  In Ixonia State 
Bank v. Ingersoll (In re Ingersoll),63 an individual sod farmer entered 
into a series of loans with a bank.64  Upon default by the farmer, the 
characterization of the loans under the WCA became an issue.65  The 
court held that the loans could be separately categorized depending 
upon whether each loan was primarily for a business purpose or a 
personal one.66 
On the other hand, in Parent v. Citibank (S.D.) N.A.,67 the Parents 
were the sole owners of a limited liability company (LLC) that was in 
the business of constructing log cabins.68  An entrepreneur contracted 
with the Parents’ LLC for the construction of a log cabin.69  The purpose 
of the contract was speculation in that after the LLC constructed the log 
cabin, the entrepreneur intended to sell it for a profit.70  The log cabin 
material was purchased at Home Depot and placed on the 
entrepreneur’s credit card.71  Thereafter, a dispute arose between the 
entrepreneur and the LLC, and the entrepreneur decided not to go 
forward with the contract.72  As a result, the entrepreneur directed 
Home Depot to transfer the account balance for the log cabin material 
from the entrepreneur’s credit card to the Parents’ personal credit 
 
62. Ixonia State Bank v. Ingersoll (In re Ingersoll), 8 B.R. 912, 916 (Bankr. W.D. 
Wis. 1981). 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 914. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 916 (“The Ixonia and Co-op loans were for agricultural purposes, so as to them 
Ingersoll was a ‘customer’ and the loans are ‘consumer credit transactions’ within the 
meaning of the Wisconsin Consumer Act (WCA). . . .  As to loans Ingersoll procured for 
business purposes, he would not be a ‘customer’ under the WCA’s definition and the loans 
therefore could not be ‘consumer credit transactions.’”). 
67. Parent v. Citibank (S.D.) N.A., No. 09 C 951, 2010 WL 2425943 (E.D. Wis. June 11, 
2010), aff’d sub nom. Parent v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 11-3665 (7th Cir. Sept. 24, 
2012). 
68. Id. at *1. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at *3.  
71. Id. at *1. 
72. Id. 
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card.73  Home Depot complied and directed Citibank to transfer the 
balance from the entrepreneur’s credit card to the Parents personal 
credit card.74  Subsequently, litigation ensued between the Parents and 
Citibank regarding their credit card balance.75  As part of the litigation, 
the Parents asserted that Citibank violated the WCA.76  The central 
issue in the case was “whether the transaction at issue was a consumer 
transaction . . . or a business transaction.”77  The court held that the 
dispute between Citibank and the Parents was subject to the WCA.78  
The initial transaction, the log cabin purchase, was a business 
transaction; however, this transaction was between only the 
entrepreneur and Home Depot—neither Parent nor their LLC was a 
party to the transaction.79  The second transaction, however, between 
the Parents and Citibank was held to be a personal transaction.80  The 
court reasoned that the definition of “transaction” includes the concept 
of “performance pursuant to [an] agreement.”81  Because the credit card 
agreement between the Parents and Citibank was premised on 
purchases for personal, family, and household purposes, the payment of 
the debt transferred to the card anticipated performance pursuant to 
that particular agreement.82  The fact that the specific charge originally 
had a business purpose was not significant to the court.83  Therefore, the 
court concluded that the Parents were customers for purposes of that 
transaction.84 
The Parent decision is difficult to reconcile with the 50% rule, which 
provides that real property, personal property, services, money, or credit 
is considered used for personal, family, or household purposes if it is 
used 50% or more for that purpose.85  In Parent, the entire purpose of 
 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at *2. 
77. Id. at *3. 
78. Id. at *4. 
79. Id. at *3. 
80. See id. at *4. 
81. Id. at *3 (internal quotations omitted). 
82. Id. at *4. 
83. See id. at *3. 
84. Id. at *4. 
85. WIS. ADMIN. CODE DFI-WCA § 1.06 (2007).  
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purchasing the log cabin material was for business purposes, but when 
the balance was transferred to a personal credit card, the court 
concluded that the debt was for personal, family, and household 
purposes.86  Because the purchase of the log cabin kit was 100% for 
business reasons, the Parent decision seems to be in conflict with the 
50% rule.  Stated simply, the Parent decision stands for the proposition 
that when a credit card is established as one for personal, family, or 
household purposes, any debt charged (or transferred) to that card will 
be considered a consumer debt, notwithstanding the fact that the debt 
may have originally been for a business purpose.87 
The better approach is reflected in the Ingersoll case.  Ingersoll 
indicates that the court should look at the basic purpose for each 
transaction, which would suggest that where an individual charges both 
personal and business purchases to a credit card, the court needs to 
distinguish the business from the personal purchases for purposes of 
applying the WCA.88  Thus, litigation revolving around a single credit 
card balance could involve WCA violations (for actions taken involving 
personal debts on the card), even though the card balance may also 
contain business debts.89   
Although no court has suggested it, another approach would be to 
use the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) “predominate test,” which 
would require the court to determine whether the charges on the credit 
card are predominately business or personal ones, and proceed 
accordingly.90  The WCA expressly provides that unless superseded by 
the WCA, the provisions of the UCC (Chapters 401–411 of the 
 
86. Parent, 2010 WL 2425943, at *4. 
87. Id. 
88. See Ixonia State Bank v. Ingersoll (In re Ingersoll), 8 B.R. 912, 916 (Bankr. W.D. 
Wis. 1981). 
89. See id. 
90. Van Sistine v. Tollard, 95 Wis. 2d 678, 684, 291 N.W.2d 636, 639 (Ct. App. 1980) 
(quoting Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 1974)).  
In determining whether a mixed contract for goods and services is a sale of goods 
under the code, “The test for inclusion or exclusion [within the code] is not whether 
they are mixed, but, granting that they are mixed, whether their predominant factor, 
their thrust, their purpose, reasonably stated, is the rendition of service, with goods 
incidentally involved (e.g., contract with artist for painting) or is a transaction of 
sale, with labor incidentally involved (e.g., installation of a water heater in a 
bathroom.” 
Id. 
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Wisconsin Statutes) shall supplement the WCA.91 
C. Merchant 
A consumer credit transaction requires that the transaction involve a 
customer and a merchant.  Although the concept of merchant is a legal 
term of art,92 the WCA substantially expands its meaning.  The WCA 
defines a merchant as a natural person or organization 
who regularly advertises, distributes, offers, supplies or deals in 
real or personal property, services, money or credit in a manner 
which directly or indirectly results in or is intended . . . to result 
in . . . a consumer transaction.  The term includes, but is not 
limited to a seller, lessor, manufacturer, creditor, arranger of 
credit and any assignee of or successor to such person.  The term 
also includes a person who by his or her occupation holds himself 
or herself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to such 
practices or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed 
by his or her employment as an agent, broker or other 
intermediary.93 
Although the WCA provides a substantial definition of merchant, “the 
legislature has failed to define the outer limits of the term merchant.”94  
It has been suggested, however, that the courts examine the purpose to 
be served by the definition in order to determine its meaning.95  In that 
regard, it has been determined that the general legislative intent of the 
WCA is to govern the relationship between consumers and retail 
merchants who operate a business for profit.96  As a result, the merchant 
definition has been held to apply to retail merchants in the businesses of 
regularly extending credit and also to private commercial businesses 
that operate for profit.97  The definition does not include governmental 
 
91. WIS. STAT. § 421.103(1) (2009–2010).  Hereinafter, all provisions of the UCC are 
cited according to the applicable section of the Wisconsin Statutes that has enacted the UCC. 
92. Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 306 (1992) (noting that a legal term of art is 
one that has a widely accepted common-law meaning).   
93. WIS. STAT. § 421.301(25). 
94. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Mussallem, 94 Wis. 2d 657, 668, 289 N.W.2d 
801, 806 (1980). 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 667, 289 N.W.2d at 806. 
97. Id. at 668, 289 N.W.2d at 806–07. 
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operations.98  For example, the Wisconsin Department of Revenue is not 
considered to be a merchant.99 
The merchant definition in the WCA is significantly different than 
the merchant definition contained in the UCC.100  The UCC definition 
anticipates two types of merchants.101  One is a merchant who deals in 
goods of the kind and is called a goods merchant.102  The other merchant 
is one who is familiar with the practices of the particular business or 
trade and is called a practices merchant.103  Both the UCC and the WCA 
use the same definition for a practices merchant.104  However, with one 
minor exception,105 the merchant definition under the WCA is much 
broader than the goods merchant under the UCC.106  For example, the 
WCA definition includes sellers of real property, services, and credit 
that are not covered by the UCC.107  Also, the WCA definition applies to 
transactions in personal property; whereas, the UCC covers only 
transactions in goods.108  “Personal property” is a much broader term 
than “goods.”109  Personal property includes not only movable property 
(goods) but also intangible things.110  The difference between the two 
definitions is rational in light of the purpose of each definition.111  The 
 
98. Id. at 668, 289 N.W.2d at 807. 
99. Ludwig v. Geise (In re Geise), 132 B.R. 908, 913 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1991). 
100. Compare WIS. STAT. § 421.301(25) (WCA definition of merchant), with id. 
§ 402.104(3) (UCC definition of merchant).  
101. Id. § 402.104(3).  Some consider a merchant who meets both types of “merchant” to 
be an independent third type of merchant.  See U.C.C. § 2-104 cmt. 2 (2010).  
102. See U.C.C. § 2-104 cmt. 2 (2010). 
103. See id. 
104. Compare WIS. STAT. § 402.104(3), with id. § 421.301(25). 
105. See infra text accompanying notes 114–18. 
106. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Mussallem, 94 Wis. 2d 657, 667, 289 N.W.2d 
801, 806 (1980) (“The legislature has given the term merchant a broader meaning than usually 
attributed to the term . . . .”). 
107. Compare WIS. STAT. § 421.301(25) (a WCA merchant deals in real or personal 
property, services, money or credit), with id. § 402.104 (3) (a UCC merchant deals only in 
goods). 
108. Compare id. § 402.104(3), and U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (2010), with WIS. STAT. 
§ 421.301(25). 
109. Compare BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1335–36 (9th ed. 2009) (defining property), 
with id. at 762 (defining goods). 
110. Id. at 1335–36 (defining property). 
111. Compare U.C.C § 2-104 cmt. 1 (“This section lays the foundation of this policy by 
defining . . . professionals or ‘merchants’ and by stating when a transaction is . . . ‘between 
merchants.’”), with WIS. STAT. § 421.102(1) (“Chapters . . . shall be liberally construed and 
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UCC definition is a limiting term intended to identify certain 
transactions that involve professionals, and thereby, is intended to apply 
special rules to that particular transaction.112  Conversely, the WCA 
definition is an expansive term designed “to protect consumers [from] 
unfair, deceptive, false, misleading and unconscionable practices by 
merchants.”113 
The one minor exception where the WCA definition of a merchant 
is narrower than the UCC definition relates to educational institutions.114  
The UCC does apply to universities.115  Whereas, “public and private[] 
nonprofit institutions of higher learning are not” considered to be 
merchants under the WCA,116 despite the fact that educational services 
are expressly covered by the WCA.117  However, courts have concluded 
that private profit-making business colleges or trade schools that 
provide credit or loans to their students are covered by the WCA.118 
Courts have been consistent in applying the broad WCA merchant 
definition to private commercial businesses.119  A bank, for example, is a 
merchant.120  Also, one who “regularly advertises or deals in real 
property” is a merchant.121  For example, the court concluded that an 
individual who advertised in a local newspaper every week for four 
months that financing was available for the sale of mobile homes is a 
 
applied to promote their underlying purposes and policies.”). 
112. U.C.C § 2-104 cmt. 1. 
113. WIS. STAT. § 421.102(2)(b). 
114. Compare U.C.C. § 2-104 cmt. 3 (“[E]ven persons such as universities . . . can come 
within the definition of merchant if they have regular purchasing departments or business 
personnel who are familiar with business practices and who are equipped to take any action 
required.”), with Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Mussallem, 94 Wis. 2d 657, 669–70, 
289 N.W. 2d 801, 807 (1980) (holding that the WCA does not apply to “public and private, 
nonprofit institutions of higher learning”). 
115. See U.C.C. § 2-104 cmt. 3. 
116. Mussallem, 94 Wis. 2d at 669–70, 289 N.W. 2d at 807. 
117. WIS. STAT. § 421.301(42)(a)(2). 
118. See Patzka v. Viterbo Coll., 917 F. Supp. 654, 657 (W.D. Wis. 1996); Mussallem, 94 
Wis. 2d at 669–70, 289 N.W. 2d at 807. 
119. See Seidling v. Roedl, No. 2009AP107, 2009 WL 4912570, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 
22, 2009); Nelson v. Union Nat’l Bank, 111 Wis. 2d 313, 315 n.3, 330 N.W.2d 225, 226 n.3 (Ct. 
App. 1983); see also Hartman v. Meridian Fin. Servs., Inc., 191 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1049 (W.D. 
Wis. 2002). 
120. Nelson, 111 Wis. 2d at 315 n.3, 330 N.W.2d at 226 n.3. 
121. Seidling, 2009 WL 4912570, at *1; see also Hartman, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 1049. 
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merchant.122  An assignee of a merchant is also a merchant under the 
WCA, even though the assignee may not have a profit motive.123  On the 
other hand, where an individual loaned money to another individual to 
enable the borrower to purchase an automobile, no merchant was 
found.124  Also, if one was not originally a merchant, one does not 
become a merchant simply by applying interest charges to an overdue 
account.125 
D. Real or Personal Property, Services or Money 
The subject matter of a consumer credit transaction must be “real or 
personal property, services or money.”126  In that subject matter group, 
personal property and services are the only terms defined in the WCA.127  
The Act makes clear that personal property “includes but is not limited 
to goods.”128  Although not included in the statutory definition, courts 
have concluded that real property includes a fractional interest of real 
estate-such as a time-share.129 
Determining what types of services are covered by the WCA is 
challenging.  The types of services specified by the WCA are very 
broadly defined, and the exclusions are very narrowly defined.130  Based 
 
122. Mathews v. Ertz, No. 87-1513, 1988 WL 126440, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 1988).  
The court also considered the fact that the individual was nongovernmental and operated for 
profit.  Id. at *4 n.3. 
123. Barrows v. Petrie & Stocking, S.C., No. 08-cv-65-bbc, 2008 WL 3540405, at *6 
(W.D. Wis. Aug. 13, 2008) (“I do not agree . . . that the absence of any profit motive on the 
Association’s part means that it cannot be a ‘successor’ to a merchant under the Act.”). 
124. Radtke v. Levin, No. 01-2616, 2002 WL 772750, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2002) 
(holding that, in a dispute between two cohabitants over $1500 loaned for a down payment on 
a truck, neither was a merchant, and the dispute was “akin to that encountered in divorce 
proceedings”); Bruns v. Frederick, No. 91-2776, 1992 WL 211153, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. June 9, 
1992) (barring an action for replevin under Section 425.205 of the Wisconsin Statutes where 
the plaintiff conceded that she was not a creditor under that section or the WCA). 
125. Greve v. Laufenberg, No. 93-1549, 1994 WL 513710, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 
1994) (finding that where the plaintiff charged interest on a debt only after several years in 
order to motivate the debtor to pay, he was not a merchant where the parties “never agreed 
to deferred or installment payments on credit”). 
126. WIS. STAT. § 421.301(10) (2009–2010). 
127. See id. § 421.301(34), .301(42). 
128. Id. § 421.301(34). 
129. Hartman v. Meridian Fin. Servs., Inc., 191 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1049 (W.D. Wis. 2002). 
130. See WIS. STAT. § 421.301(42).  The WCA reads as follows:  
(a)  “Services” includes: 
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on the scope of the statutory definitions, courts have interpreted the 
definition of services inclusively.  The leading case defining the scope of 
services covered by the WCA is Seeger v. AFNI, Inc.131  As discussed 
above, in Seeger, a number of individuals entered into cell phone 
contracts with Cingular.132  When litigation ensued between the parties, 
the customers claimed that AFNI—who had purchased the accounts 
from Cingular133—violated the WCA by charging a collection fee.134  In 
their defense, AFNI asserted that cell phone contracts were not the type 
of service covered by the WCA, and further, that the plaintiffs admitted 
in their deposition that the cell phone contracts did not meet the 
definition of “services” in the Act.135  First, the court noted that the 
plaintiffs’ beliefs regarding the definition of services were irrelevant 
because the meaning of the definition “is an issue of law rather than a 
question of fact.”136  In particular, the court indicated that “judicial 
admissions are only applicable to questions of fact, and not to questions 
of law.”137  Second, the court noted that the type of services listed in the 
services definition are very “general and broad” and are unrelated to 
each other.138  For example, the court illustrated the diversity of services 
by citing “education, recreation, [and] cemetery accommodations” as a 
few of the listed services.139  In fact, the court candidly admitted that with 
such a broad and diverse list of services, “it is not entirely clear” how to 
 
 1. Work, labor and other personal services;  
 2. Privileges with respect to transportation, hotel and restaurant 
accommodations, education, entertainment, recreation, physical culture, hospital 
accommodations, funerals, cemetery accommodations, and the like; and  
  3. Insurance provided in connection with a consumer credit transaction.  
(b) “Services” does not include any services of common carriers if the tariffs, rates, 
charges, costs or expenses of such common carriers are required by law to be filed 
with or approved by the federal government or any official, department, division, 
commission or agency of the United States. 
Id. § 421.301(42). 
131. Seeger v. AFNI, Inc., No. 05-C-714, 2007 WL 1598618 (E.D. Wis. June 1, 2007). 
132. Id. at *2. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at *5. 
135. Id. at *8. 
136. Id. at *9.  
137. Id. (citing McCaskill v. SCI Mgmt. Corp., 298 F.3d 677, 682 (7th Circ. 2002)). 
138. Id. at *10. 
139. Id.   
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distinguish those services that are included from those that are not.140  
The court further found the phrase “and the like” contained in the 
service definition “not especially limiting . . . in light of the divergent 
categories of services listed.”141  As a result, the court held that cellular 
services are a type of service that would fit within the broad definition of 
services contained in the WCA.142 
E. Credit 
1.  The Elements of Granting Credit 
Credit is “the right granted by a creditor to a customer [1] to defer 
payment of debt, [2] to incur debt and defer its payment or [3] to 
purchase goods, services or interests in land on a time price basis.”143  
The term “time price basis” anticipates a process whereby a customer 
pays its contractual obligation over a period of time resulting in a higher 
overall price because finance charges are applied.144  An agreement to 
pay annual maintenance fees, however, is not a time price basis 
contract.145 
If no credit is extended there can be no consumer credit transaction 
or consumer approval transaction.146  One who buys delinquent accounts 
for collection is not one who supplies credit.147  Rather, the credit is 
extended by other entities before the account became delinquent.148  A 
 
140. Id.   
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. WIS. STAT. § 421.301(14) (2009–2010). 
144. Berndt v. Fairfield Resorts, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1134 (W.D. Wis. 2004). 
145. Id. (holding the WCA inapplicable to a transaction between a couple owning a 
condominium timeshare and the condominium owner’s association because “time price basis” 
is a “process in which a consumer pays portions of the total amount owed over a fixed period 
of time and agrees to a higher overall price after finance charges are applied” and not after 
“plaintiffs’ agreement to pay annual maintenance fees”). 
146. See Bechstein v. Brandenburger & Davis, 474 F. Supp. 971, 973 (E.D. Wis. 1979) 
(finding the transaction at issue was not a “consumer credit transaction” as defined in the 
WCA because “[t]he plaintiff’s obligation to the defendant in this case involved neither the 
payment of installments nor credit for which a finance charge might be imposed”). 
147. See Rsidue, LLC v. Michaud, 2006 WI App 164, ¶ 13, 295 Wis. 2d 585, 721 N.W.2d 
718 (holding that a corporation that purchased an overdue credit card account and attempted 
to collect on the debt is not a creditor because the decision to extend credit was made by its 
predecessors in interest). 
148. Id. 
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creditor’s withdrawal of funds from an individual’s account to cover a 
nonsufficient funds (NSF) check149 is also not considered a credit 
transaction.150 
The concept of “agreement” is critical when analyzing whether 
credit has been granted in a particular transaction.  Before the debt is 
incurred, there must be an agreement to extend credit.151  The WCA 
defines agreement as “the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their 
language or by implication from other circumstances including course of 
dealing or usage of trade or course of performance.”152  “Course of 
dealing” is used to describe the practices under past contracts between 
the parties;153 “course of performance” describes the practices under the 
current contract between the parties;154 and “trade practice” is the 
general practices in the particular industry that is the subject matter of 
the transaction.155  In other words, in deciding whether the merchant has 
granted credit to the customer, the courts analyze the contract between 
the parties, their course of dealing, their course of performance and 
trade practices, as well as any implications from other circumstances 
relevant to the transaction.156  A classic example of extending credit is 
where the parties’ agreement includes the loan and financing terms of 
the transaction—an agreement to incur debt and defer payment.157  
However, charging interest after a debt is due does not involve 
extending credit.158 
2.  Judicial Interpretation of Granting Credit 
There are a number of principles that can be garnered from the 
 
149. Endo Steel, Inc. v. Janas (In re JWJ Contracting Co.), 371 F.3d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir. 
2004) (noting that a NSF check is one that has been dishonored due to insufficient funds).   
150. Co-op Credit Union v. Bement, No. 02-2403, 2003 WL 21027264, at *2 (Wis. Ct. 
App. May 8, 2003). 
151. See WIS. STAT. § 421.301(14) (2009–2010). 
152. Id. § 421.301(3). 
153. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 223 (1981). 
154. See id. § 202 cmt. g. 
155. Id. § 222. 
156. See, e.g., Seeger v. AFNI, Inc., No. 05-C-714, 2007 WL 1598618, at *5–16 (E.D. 
Wis. June 1, 2007); Hartman v. Meridian Fin. Servs., Inc., 191 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1048–49 
(W.D. Wis. 2002). 
157. See, e.g., Hartman, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 1049. 
158. Greve v. Laufenberg, No. 93-1549, 1994 WL 513710, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 
1994).   
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various decisions by the courts.  First, if the agreement between the 
merchant and customer has a fixed term, the court will likely conclude 
that the merchant granted credit.159  Second, in the absence of a fixed-
term contract, the courts use a balancing test to determine if the 
merchant granted credit.160  Third, in applying the balancing test, courts 
consider “other circumstances” such as course of dealing, course of 
performance, and trade practice.161  Fourth, courts do not consider credit 
granted simply because a debt is “paid over time.”162  And finally, a 
merchant’s grant of a thirty-day grace period for payment does not 
appear to be a grant of credit by the merchant.163 
First, several cases have focused on fixed-term contracts that permit 
a customer to incur debt and pay it over time.164  In Seeger v. AFNI, 
Inc.,165 the plaintiffs entered into cell phone contracts with Cingular for a 
fixed term.166  When litigation ensued between the parties, the plaintiffs 
asserted that the cell phone contracts involved the extension of credit 
under the WCA.167  The plaintiffs argued that their cellular plan allowed 
them to exceed “their monthly allotment of minutes and pay later,” 
which, they argued, is tantamount to an extension of credit.168  On the 
other hand, AFNI—who had purchased the accounts from Cingular169—
argued that the cell phone contracts should be considered either a 
prepaid or pay-as-you-go service.170  The court noted that “purchasers of 
cell phone services receive their services prior to paying for them, which 
 
159. See Seeger, 2007 WL 1598618, at *12; Milwaukee Alarm Co. v. Chaney, No. 97-
0866, 1998 WL 60976, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 1998). 
160. See Degrave v. Door Cnty. Coop., No. 96-1606, 1996 WL 722828, at *2 (Wis. Ct. 
App. Dec. 17, 1996). 
161. See id.; see also WIS. STAT. § 421.301(3).   
162. Dean Med. Ctr., S.C. v. Conners, 2000 WI App 202, ¶ 12, 238 Wis. 2d 636, 618 
N.W.2d 194; Langheim v. Kasch, No. 93-1603-FT, 1993 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1339, at *7–8 (Oct. 
21, 1993). 
163. Alaskan Fireplace, Inc. v. Everett, No. 02-3016-FT, 2003 WL 21397747, at *1, *4 
(Wis. Ct. App. June 18, 2003); Hooven v. Truck Country, No. 97-2215, 1998 Wisc. App. 
LEXIS 655, at *5 (June 9, 1998). 
164. See Seeger, 2007 WL 1598618, at *3, *14; Milwaukee Alarm Co., 1998 WL 60976, at 
*1. 
165. Seeger, 2007 WL 1598618. 
166. Id. at *3.  
167. Id. at *10. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at *2. 
170. Id. at *10. 
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technically amounts to a deferment of payment.”171  Further, the court 
reasoned that when one signs a service contract, he or she has a 
continuing obligation to pay money to that service provider and thereby 
has incurred debt.172  Furthermore, the court noted that the plaintiffs 
were allowed to defer payment of their contractual debt by making 
payment after they received the service.173  Therefore, the court 
concluded that the cell phone contracts satisfied the definition of credit 
because the contracts “allowed the plaintiffs to incur debt and defer its 
payment.”174  Interestingly, during the litigation, Cingular obtained a 
written opinion from the Secretary of the Department of Financial 
Institutions stating that cell phone contracts are not an extension of 
credit.175  Based on that opinion, Cingular asserted that the WCA’s safe 
harbor provision176—which protects companies from liability when they 
rely upon a written opinion of the administrator—should apply.177  The 
court concluded, however, that Cingular’s informal e-mail to the 
administrator did not comply with the procedures necessary under the 
safe harbor provision, that Cingular was attempting to obtain a ruling 
from an entity other than the court, and that any such ruling would not 
be binding on the court.178 
Similarly, in Milwaukee Alarm Co. v. Chaney,179 a customer signed a 
five-year alarm service contract for $19 per month, billed quarterly, with 
a termination fee if the customer canceled the contract before the end of 
the five-year term.180  During litigation between the parties, the issue 
became whether the alarm service contract was an extension of credit.181  
Milwaukee Alarm argued that the service contract was a payment for a 
services-as-rendered agreement, so the customer had no obligation to 
 
171. Id. at *12.    
172. Id.  
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
176. WIS. STAT. § 426.104(4)(a) (2009–2010). 
177. Seeger, 2007 WL 1598618, at *13. 
178. Id. 
179. Milwaukee Alarm Co. v. Chaney, No. 97-0866, 1998 WL 60976 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 
17, 1998). 
180. Id. at *1. 
181. Id. 
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pay unless the customer received services.182  The court disagreed.  The 
court reasoned that the customer incurred debt the moment he signed 
the contract and was permitted to defer its payment over the five-year 
period.183  As a result, this transaction was found to be an extension of 
credit.184 
Second, if the agreement between the parties does not have a fixed 
term, the courts use an objective test when considering the other 
circumstances relevant to the transaction, including course of dealing, 
course of performance, and trade practice.185  In DeGrave v. Door 
County Cooperative,186 consumers—who were members of a co-op—
periodically made purchases for their farm from the co-op.187  Purchases 
were made on credit and cash.188  Each invoice sent to the consumers 
provided that “all purchases [were] due within the following month,” 
and “[a] finance charge of 1.5% per month . . . [would] be assessed” on 
all outstanding balances.189  The issue before the court was whether the 
purchases that were due within the following month were a credit 
transaction.190  Upon viewing the terms of the invoice, the court 
concluded that the terms “implie[d] permission for [the co-op] 
member[s] to pay in multiple payments, including payments after the 
designated due date.”191  Despite the co-op’s insistence that “the invoices 
unambiguously required payment by a certain date,” the court 
concluded that “a reasonable person reading [the invoice] terms could 
believe that the co-op permitted payments after the due date.”192  The 
court considered it significant that the consequence of making a 
payment after the due date was the imposition of a finance charge.193 
 
182. Id. at *2. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. 
185. Degrave v. Door Cnty. Coop., No. 96-1606, 1996 WL 722828, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. 
Dec. 17, 1996) (applying a reasonable person standard to determine whether the invoice 
terms unambiguously required payment by a specific date); see also WIS. STAT. § 421.301(3). 
186. Degrave, 1996 WL 722828, at *1. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. 
189. Id.  
190. Id. 
191. Id. at *2. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. 
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Third, although not discussed in the DeGrave decision, it is likely 
that the course of dealing between the co-op and the DeGraves (and the 
other co-op members), as well as the general trade practice of co-ops, 
were other circumstances relevant to the determination of whether 
credit was granted.  For instance, in Dean Medical Center, S.C. v. 
Conners,194 where the Medical Center provided services to a patient, the 
court considered other circumstances relevant to whether credit was 
granted.195  Upon nonpayment by the patient, the Medical Center 
initiated a collection action.196  The issue before the court was whether 
the transaction between the parties was a consumer credit transaction.197  
More specifically, the issue was whether the Medical Center had agreed 
to extend credit to the patient by permitting the patient to pay for the 
medical services through installment payments.198  The Medical Center 
argued that there were no circumstances that would suggest that credit 
was being extended to the patient.199  The patient argued that the 
Medical Center’s “practice of regularly allowing customers to pay their 
bills over time” indicated that credit was regularly extended by the 
Center.200  The court looked at a number of factors in reaching its 
decision.201  First, there was no evidence that would indicate that there 
was an agreement between the parties for the extension of credit.202  
Second, credit is not extended or created simply by not paying a debt.203  
Third, it was the Medical Center’s “customary business practice” not to 
offer credit or to permit the patient to pay in installments at the time the 
 
194. Dean Med. Ctr., S.C. v. Conners, 2000 WI App 202, 238 Wis. 2d 636, 618 N.W.2d 
194. 
195. Id. ¶ 2. 
196. Id. ¶ 3. 
197. Id. ¶ 5 (explaining that the issue of “[w]hether a particular transaction is a 
consumer credit transaction subject to the WCA is a mixed question of fact and law”). 
198. Id. ¶ 8. 
199. Id. (explaining that the Medical Center argued that no facts showed that “payment 
for the services could be made either in installments or be subject to the imposition of a 
finance charge”). 
200. Id. 
201. Id. ¶ 12. 
202. See id. (“[W]e would have to re-write the agreement under which services had 
already been provided were we to allow those services to create a consumer debt simply by 
virtue of nonpayment.”). 
203. Id. ¶ 13. 
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services were rendered.204  The court noted that the only time patients 
were permitted to pay their bill over time was when the patient had 
failed to pay the bill in full within thirty days205 after the services were 
rendered.206  Based on the foregoing, the court concluded that 
“permitting a debtor to pay over time only after attempts at collecting 
the bill . . . have failed” is not an extension of credit.207 
Similarly, in Langheim v. Kasch,208 a doctor provided medical 
services to a patient on ten occasions.209  In a subsequent collection 
dispute between the parties, the sole issue before the court was whether 
the contract between the doctor and patient was a consumer credit 
transaction.210  The court concluded that the patient was unable to show 
that the doctor’s services were rendered on credit.211  The evidence 
indicated that when services were first provided to the patient, the 
doctor required the patient to fill out an information sheet, which would 
include his insurance reimbursement number.212  Unfortunately, the 
patient provided an incorrect insurance reimbursement number, which 
caused the debt to accrue.213  The court reasoned that the inference 
drawn from the doctor requesting the insurance reimbursement number 
was that the doctor was not providing services on a credit basis.214  
Again, the course of dealing between the parties and the general trade 
practice in the medical service industry likely had an impact on the 
court’s decision. 
Fourth, and finally, there are the curious cases where payment is due 
within thirty days, and the courts find no extension of credit.  In Alaskan 
Fireplace, Inc. v. Everett,215 consumers contracted for the installation of 
 
204. Id. ¶ 12. 
205. See id. ¶ 11 (“When payment is not made on the date of service, patients are told 
that Dean will send them a bill that is due in full within thirty days of receipt.”). 
206. Id. ¶ 13. 
207. Id. 
208. Langheim v. Kasch, No. 93-1603-FT, 1993 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1339 (Oct. 21, 1993). 
209. Id. at *6. 
210. Id. at *1. 
211. Id. at *6–7. 
212. Id. at *2. 
213. Id. 
214. Id. at *7–8. 
215. Alaskan Fireplace, Inc. v. Everett, No. 02-3016-FT, 2003 WL 21397747 (Wis. Ct. 
App. June 18, 1998). 
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two fireplaces.216  The customers “never discussed financing terms with 
Alaskan Fireplace.”217  The contract signed by the parties provided that 
payment was to be made “net 30 days [with a] 1.5% monthly service 
charge for overdue invoices.”218  In a subsequent dispute between the 
parties, the court had to decide whether the transaction was a consumer 
credit transaction.219  The court held that the transaction was a cash 
transaction, not a consumer credit transaction.220  The court reasoned 
that the contract terms did not anticipate the extension of credit.221  The 
court interpreted the contract terms to mean that “Alaskan Fireplace 
did not grant the [customer] permission to defer payment of their 
debt.”222  In sum, the court found “[t]here was never any intent by 
Alaskan Fireplace to extend any credit.”223  Similarly, in Hooven v. 
Truck Country,224 a truck repair business failed to successfully repair a 
customer’s truck, and the customer did not pay the bill.225  The invoice 
sent by the truck repair business indicated that payment was due thirty 
days after services were rendered, and in the event of failure to pay, an 
18% finance charge would be assessed.226  The court had to decide 
whether the customer’s failure to pay the repair bill amounted to an 
extension of credit.227  The court held that the truck repair business did 
not extend credit to the customer.228  The court reasoned that the 
trucking company expected payment in full when it completed its 
repairs.229 
Despite what the cases hold, under any reasonable interpretation of 
the term credit, the merchant is granting credit—if only, for only a 
thirty-day period.  The statute does not specify any minimum time 
 
216. Id. at *1. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. 
219. Id. at *4. 
220. Id. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. 
224. Hooven v. Truck Country, No. 97-2215, 1998 Wisc. App. LEXIS 655 (June 9, 1998).  
225. Id. at *1.   
226. Id. at *5. 
227. Id. at *4. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. 
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period for the extension of credit,230 and the creditor has given the 
customer the right to defer payment for thirty days.  On the other hand, 
although unstated, it is possible that the courts recognize a general 
industry practice to treat a thirty-day payment the same as a cash 
payment.  However, that is not in accord with at least one court’s 
decision, which held that a cash transaction occurs when the customer 
pays before the services are rendered.231 
F. Payable in Installments or Finance Charge Imposed 
In order to qualify as a consumer credit transaction, the customer’s 
obligation must be either payable in “installments” or provide that “a 
finance charge is or may be imposed.”232  This Part analyzes both 
elements. 
1. Payable in Installments 
Payable in installments is a precisely defined term: 
[M]ean[ing] that payment is required or permitted by agreement 
to be made in [one of three ways]:  
(a) Two or more installments, excluding the down payment in 
a consumer credit sale, with respect to an obligation arising from 
a consumer credit transaction for which a finance charge is or 
may be imposed;  
(b) More than 4 installments, excluding the down payment in a 
consumer credit sale, in any other consumer credit transaction; 
or  
(c) Two or more installments if any installment other than the 
down payment is more than twice the amount of any other 
installment, excluding the down payment.233 
The definition of payable in installments provides that installments are 
 
230. See WIS. STAT. § 421.301(10) (2009–2010) (defining “consumer credit transaction”); 
id. § 421.301(14) (defining “credit”). 
231. See Berndt v. Fairfield Resorts, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1134 (W.D. Wis. 2004) 
(holding that a bill sent to condo timeshare owners by a condo owners association amounted 
to a cash transaction because the owners were to pay their bill before the services were 
rendered). 
232. WIS. STAT. § 421.301(10). 
233. Id. § 421.301(30). 
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“required or permitted by agreement.”234  The WCA defines agreement 
as “the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language or by 
implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or 
usage of trade or course of performance.”235  Other circumstances 
relevant to the transaction include (1) whether the amount payable 
under the parties’ agreement was subject to any variable, such as usage, 
and (2) whether the merchant took any action to indicate that the 
account was overdue.236  Course of dealing means the parties’ practices 
under past contracts.237  Course of performance means the parties’ 
practices under the current contract between them.238  Trade practice 
means the general practices in the particular industry that is the subject 
matter of the transaction.239  In sum, in deciding whether the agreement 
permits the customer to pay in installments, courts analyze the contract 
between the parties, their prior course of dealing, their current course of 
performance, and trade practices—as well as any implications from 
other circumstances relevant to the transaction.240  The courts appear to 
be using an objective test when considering the various circumstances. 
An example of the application of the objective test is DeGrave v. 
Door County Cooperative.241  As previously discussed, in DeGrave, 
customers purchased farm supplies on credit from a co-op.242  The co-
op’s invoice, which was sent to the customers each month, provided that 
“all purchases [were] due within the following month.  A finance charge 
of 1.5% per month, or 18% per year [would] be assessed on the previous 
balance less credits and payments.”243  In a subsequent dispute between 
the parties, the customers argued that their obligation to the co-op was 
 
234. Id. 
235. Id. § 421.301(3). 
236. See, e.g., Seeger v. AFNI, Inc., No. 05-C-714, 2007 WL 1598618, at *12 (E.D. Wis. 
June 1, 2007); Dean Med. Ctr., S.C. v. Conners, 2000 WI App 202, ¶ 12, 238 Wis. 2d 636, 618 
N.W.2d 194; Degrave v. Door Cnty. Coop., No. 96-1606, 1996 WL 722828, at *2 (Wis. Ct. 
App. Dec. 17, 1996). 
237. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 223 (1981). 
238. Id. § 202 cmt. g. 
239. Id. § 222. 
240. See Seeger, 2007 WL 1598618; Dean Med. Ctr., 2000 WI App 202, 238 Wis. 2d 636, 
618 N.W.2d 194; Degrave, 1996 WL 722828. 
241. Degrave, 1996 WL 722828. 
242. Id. at *1. 
243. Id. 
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payable in installments.244  On the other hand, the co-op argued that the 
invoices clearly required the customers to pay “by a certain date and 
that therefore the [customers] were not granted the privilege of paying 
in installments.”245  The court held that the terms of the contract 
“implie[d] permission for a [co-op] member to pay in multiple 
payments, including payments after the designated due date.”246  The 
court noted that “[t]he only consequence of making [a] payment[] after 
the due date [was] the addition of a finance charge.”247  The court 
indicated that a reasonable person reading the invoice terms “could 
believe the co-op permitted payments after the due date.”248  
Interestingly, the invoice terms provided no set number of installment 
payments, yet the court found the incurred debt to be payable in 
installments.249 
Another important factor regarding payable by installments was 
considered by the court in Dean Medical Center, S.C. v. Conners.250 As 
discussed earlier, in Dean, a medical center provided services to a 
patient.251  Upon nonpayment by the patient, the Medical Center 
initiated a collection action against the former patient.252  The court 
determined that there was not a consumer credit transaction.  Important 
in the court’s holding, was the determination that the contract between 
the Medical Center and the patient did not allow for payment by 
installments, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant was allowed to 
pay after payment was due.253  The court noted that to establish that a 
debt was payable by installment the patients must be given “the option 
of paying in installments at the time the services are provided.”254  In 
Dean, there was no indication that the patient was aware of the Medical 
Center’s policies that allowed for credit payments after payment was 
 
244. Id. at *2. 
245. Id. 
246. Id. 
247. Id. 
248. Id. 
249. See id. at *1. 
250. Dean Med. Ctr., S.C. v. Conners, 2000 WI App 202, 238 Wis. 2d 636, 618 N.W.2d 
194. 
251. Id. ¶ 2. 
252. Id. ¶ 3. 
253. Id. ¶ 13. 
254. Id. ¶ 12. 
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due.255  The court, closely scrutinized the Medical Center’s method of 
collection:  
The bill requests payment in full within thirty days.  If no 
payment is received, a second bill is sent showing a past due 
balance.  If Dean receives no response to that bill, a third 
statement is sent, and a phone call is made to try and collect the 
debt.  If the debt still is not paid, a fourth bill is sent with a notice 
that the debt is being referred to a collection agency. 
. . . [I]f a patient responds to any of the billing statements by 
claiming an inability to pay in full, Dean will permit the debt to 
be paid over time.  [F]inance charges are never imposed on any 
[of these] payments made over time. 
. . . [A]t the time services are provided, patients are not 
informed that they can pay the bill in installments, nor are they 
informed about payment plans.  When payment is not made on 
the date of service, patients are told that Dean will send them a 
bill that is due in full within thirty days of receipt.256 
Thus, as the court held, at the time the Medical Center rendered the 
services, it neither offered credit nor allowed the patient to pay in 
installments.257  Based on the foregoing, the court concluded, 
“permitting a debtor to pay over time only after attempts at collecting 
the bill have failed does not . . . [create] a consumer credit 
transaction.”258 
Another critical factor in determining whether a series of payments 
is payable in installments is whether the amount payable under the 
parties’ agreement is subject to any variable, such as usage.259  In Seeger 
v. AFNI, Inc.,260 as previously discussed, the plaintiffs entered into cell 
phone agreements with Cingular.261  In a subsequent dispute between the 
parties, the issue before the court was whether entering into the cell 
 
255. Id. ¶ 10–12. 
256. Id. ¶ 3. 
257. Id. 
258. Id. 
259. See Seeger v. AFNI, Inc., No. 05-C-714, 2007 WL 1598618, at *14 (E.D. Wis. June 1, 
2007). 
260. Id. at *1. 
261. Id. 
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phone agreement was a consumer credit transaction.262  More 
specifically, the issue was whether a cell phone contract was the type of 
obligation that was payable in installments.263  A typical cellular contract 
provides a minimum fee each month for a certain amount of cellular 
minutes but also allows the customer to pay extra for minutes used 
beyond their allotted amount.264  Each month the invoice requires 
payment for the cell-phone services specifically provided in the prior 
month.265  The court concluded that even though the cell phone contract 
is a form of credit, it is not credit that is payable in installments.266  The 
court reasoned that the contract does not permit the customer to pay 
bills in installments, but rather the customer is obligated to pay the 
entire bill for the prior month’s use.267  In its analysis, the court 
compared a cell phone contract with an alarm service contract.268  The 
court noted that an alarm service contract is for a fixed-year service 
length and is billed at a specified cost per month.269  The total cost of the 
service is determined by multiplying the monthly cost by the total 
number of months in the contract.270  The monthly cost is not dependent 
on the customer’s use of the alarm service.271  Most importantly, the 
customer is not being charged monthly or quarterly “for services 
specifically provided for that [period],” but rather is paying off the total 
contract price in installments over a predetermined period.272  The 
critical factor appears to be that the alarm service contract has no 
variable, whereas the cellular contract is subject to the customer’s usage. 
2. Finance Charge Imposed 
 In order to qualify as a consumer credit transaction, a customer’s 
obligation must be either “payable in installments or for which . . . a 
 
262. Id. at *5.   
263. Id. at *14.   
264. Id. at *15. 
265. Id. 
266. Id. at *16. 
267. Id. at *15. 
268. Id. at *14–15. 
269. Id. at *15. 
270. Id. 
271. Id. 
272. Id. 
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finance charge is or may be imposed.”273  This section analyzes what 
constitutes a finance charge.  A finance charge is 
[T]he sum of all charges, payable directly or indirectly by the 
customer as an incident to or as a condition of the extension of 
credit . . . .  The term does not include any charge with respect to 
a motor vehicle consumer lease.  The term includes the following 
types of charges to the extent they are not permitted additional 
charges[,] . . . delinquency charges . . . or deferral charges . . . :  
(a) Interest, time price differential and any amount payable 
under a discount or other system of additional charges;  
(b) Service, transaction, activity or carrying charge;  
(c) Loan fee, points, finder’s fee or similar charge;  
(d) Fee for an appraisal, investigation or credit report;  
(e) Any charge imposed by a creditor upon another creditor 
for purchasing or accepting an obligation of a customer if the 
customer is required to pay any part of that charge . . . ;  
(f) Premium or other charge for guarantee or insurance 
protecting the creditor against the customer’s default or other 
credit loss;  
(g) Charges or premiums for credit life, accident or health 
insurance, written in connection with any consumer credit 
transaction to the extent they are not permitted as additional 
charges . . . ;  
(h) Charges or premiums for insurance written in connection 
with any action against loss of or damage to property or against 
liability arising out of the ownership or use of property to the 
extent they are not permitted as additional charges . . . ; and  
(i) Refund anticipation loans fees.274 
For example, in Patzka v. Viterbo College,275 a student enrolled in a 
college.276  The school provided the student with a student loan, but at 
the time of her enrollment, the school did not provide her with a student 
 
273. WIS. STAT. § 421.301(10) (2009–2010). 
274. Id. § 421.301(20); see also id. § 422.202 (defining additional charges); id. § 422.203 
(defining delinquency charges); id. § 422.204 (defining deferral charges).  
275. Patzka v. Viterbo Coll., 917 F. Supp. 654 (W.D. Wis. 1996). 
276. Id. at 657. 
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handbook that contained the financing terms for the loan.277  The loan 
did provide for interest on the outstanding balance and a collection 
fee.278  In subsequent litigation between the parties, the court indicated 
that the interest charges are specifically part of the finance charge and 
should have been disclosed to the student at the time of contracting.279  
Furthermore, in Palacios v. ABC TV & Stereo Rental of Milwaukee, 
Inc.,280 a customer entered into a contract for the use and possession of a 
color television that the customer had the option to purchase by making 
seventy-eight consecutive weekly payments of $23 per week.281  After a 
period of time, the customer stopped making payments and brought an 
action against the merchant.282  One issue before the court was whether 
the transaction included a finance charge.283  The court noted that a 
finance charge includes any “time price differential.”284  The court found 
that “a time-price differential was built into the agreement” between the 
parties.285  The court reasoned that “[t]he time-price differential was the 
difference between the fair market value of the television-stereo” and 
the price the customer would eventually pay by making the seventy-
eight payments of $23 per week.286  Therefore, the agreement between 
the parties did provide for a finance charge. 
There are three types of charges that are not considered finance 
charges.287  Those are additional charges,288 delinquency charges,289 and 
deferral charges.290  For disclosure purposes, it is critical to be able to 
 
277. Id.  
278. Id. 
279. Id. at 662. 
280. Palacios v. ABC TV & Stereo Rental of Milwaukee, Inc., 123 Wis. 2d 79, 365 
N.W.2d 882 (Ct. App. 1985). 
281. Id. at 81, 365 N.W.2d at 884. 
282. Id.  
283. See id. at 87–88, 365 N.W.2d at 886–87 (quoting WIS. STAT. § 421.301(10)) (noting 
that under the WCA, “[a] consumer credit transaction also exists where property is acquired 
on credit, ‘for which credit a finance charge is or may be imposed’”). 
284. Id. at 88, 365 N.W.2d at 887 (quoting WIS. STAT. § 421.301(20)(a)).   
285. Id. 
286. Id. 
287. See WIS. STAT. § 421.301(20) (2009–2010). 
288. See id. § 422.202 (defining additional charges). 
289. See id. § 422.203 (defining delinquency charges). 
290. See id. § 422.204 (defining deferral charges). 
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distinguish a finance charge from these other charges.291 
The critical distinction between a finance charge and an additional 
charge is whether the customer has the right to decline the charge.292  If 
the customer has the right to decline the charge, then it is considered an 
additional charge.293  On the other hand, if the charge is required as part 
of the contract, the charge is a finance charge notwithstanding it may 
have a different name.294  In Burney v. Thorn Americas, Inc.,295 Rent-A-
Center became involved in litigation with a number of its customers.296  
One of the issues before the court was whether Rent-A-Center’s 
contracts fairly disclosed the finance charge imposed in the 
transaction.297  Rent-A-Center argued that certain charges, such as 
delivery, maintenance, and termination charges, should not be 
considered part of the finance charge.298  The court noted that the 
purpose of the broad definition of finance charge contained in the WCA 
is to protect the consumer.299  A merchant should not be permitted to 
hide the true cost of the financing by designating a charge to be 
something other than a finance charge.300  The court started with the 
proposition that “any charge not part of the amount financed . . . is part 
of the finance charge” unless it qualifies as an additional, delinquency, 
or deferral charge.301  The court offered a rule to follow when 
distinguishing a finance charge from an additional charge.  The rule is 
that a customer must have the right to refuse the charge or service; 
otherwise the charge is a finance charge.302  If a customer is purchasing 
an item over time and has no choice but to take the additional charge or 
 
291. See id. § 422.301–.310. 
292. See Burney v. Thorn Ams., Inc., 944 F. Supp. 762, 775 (E.D. Wis. 1996).  See 
generally WIS. STAT. § 422.202. 
293. Burney, 944 F. Supp. at 775. 
294. Id. 
295. Id. at 762.  
296. Id. at 764.  
297. Id. (“The plaintiffs have moved for partial summary judgment on the following 
issues: . . . whether Rent-A-Center  has violated § 422.301 by failing to disclose the finance 
charge as an interest rate.”). 
298. Id. at 774. 
299. See id. (“Easily understandable and accessible information is the best protection for 
consumers.”). 
300. Id. 
301. Id. at 774–75. 
302. Id. at 775. 
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service, the charge is part of the finance charge.303  The court concluded 
that for the delivery and maintenance charges that were associated with 
the goods under contract, Rent-A-Center offered no evidence that the 
rental customer could decline either charge.304  Therefore, the charges 
were considered part of the finance charge.305  Similarly, the termination 
fee was a required part of the rent-to-own contract, and the customer 
had no option to decline that fee.306  As a result, the termination fee was 
also considered part of the finance charge.307 
One must also be able to distinguish a finance charge from a 
delinquency or default charge (a late payment fee): 
A delinquency or default charge is not a finance charge . . . if 
imposed for actual unanticipated late payment, delinquency, 
default or other such occurrence.  However, when a merchant’s 
billings are not paid in full within a stipulated time period and . . . 
the merchant does not . . . regard such accounts [to be] in default 
. . . and imposes charges periodically for delaying payment of 
such accounts . . . until paid, the charge so imposed comes within 
the definition of a finance charge.308 
Also, an account is not considered to be in default if the merchant 
“customarily fail[s] to institute collection activity or . . . continu[es] to 
extend credit” to the customer.309  The test utilized by the court appears 
to be whether a reasonable person would conclude the parties’ 
agreement anticipated payment in full by a certain date, or whether the 
customer could pay over time with the imposition of a finance charge. 
A finance charge offers the debtor the option to pay or to “defer 
payment with interest” being charged if the customer defers payment.310  
As previously discussed, in DeGrave v. Door County Cooperative,311 
 
303. Id. 
304. Id.   
305. Id. 
306. Id. 
307. Id.   
308. WIS. ADMIN. CODE DFI-WCA § 1.07 (2007). 
309. Id. 
310. Hooven v. Truck Country, No. 97-2215, 1998 Wisc. App. LEXIS 655, at *5 (June 9, 
1998). 
311. DeGrave v. Door Cnty. Coop., No. 96-1606, 1996 WL 722828 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 
17, 1996). 
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members of a co-op were permitted to buy items for use on their farm.312  
Some purchases were made in cash and others on credit.313  The contract 
with the co-op provided that “all purchases [were] due within the 
following month and a finance charge of 1.5% per month . . . [would] be 
assessed to the previous balance less credits and payments.”314  The co-
op argued that the contract terms specifically required payment by a 
certain date, and that the customers were not granted the right to pay 
after the due date.315  The court disagreed and concluded that “a 
reasonable person reading [the invoice] terms could believe that the co-
op permitted payments after the due date.”316 
A late payment fee, on the other hand, bars deferral by the customer 
and assesses interest for nonpayment by the due date.317  As discussed 
above, in Hooven v. Truck Country,318 a truck repair business entered 
into a contract with a customer to repair the customer’s truck.319  The 
truck company’s invoice provided that payment was due thirty days 
after the services were rendered, and overdue accounts would be 
assessed an 18% finance charge.320  When litigation ensued between the 
parties, the court had to determine whether the 18% charge was a 
finance charge or a late payment fee.321  Despite the fact that it was 
stated to be a finance charge in the invoice, the court construed the fee 
to be a late payment fee.322  The court noted that finance charges offer 
the debtor the option to pay or to “defer payment with interest” being 
charged if the customer defers payment.323  On the other hand, a late 
payment fee bars deferral by the customer and assesses interest for 
nonpayment by the due date.324  The evidence indicated that the truck 
 
312. Id. at *1. 
313. Id. 
314. Id. 
315. Id. at *2. 
316. Id. 
317. Hooven v. Truck Country, No. 97-2215, 1998 Wisc. App. LEXIS 655, at *5 (June 9, 
1998). 
318. Id. 
319. Id. at *1. 
320. Id. at *4. 
321. Id. at *1–2 (explaining that one claim brought by Hooven was a violation of the 
WCA for “credit finance charges”). 
322. Id. at *6. 
323. Id. at *5. 
324. Id. at *5–6. 
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repair business “demanded payment in full and charged 18% interest on 
default after a thirty-day grace period.”325  Similarly, in Alaskan 
Fireplace, Inc. v. Everett,326 Alaskan Fireplace entered into a contract 
with a customer for the installation of two fireplaces.327  The proposal 
signed by the parties provided that payment was to be made “net 30 
days [with a] 1.5% monthly service charge for overdue invoices.”328  In a 
subsequent dispute between the parties, one issue before the court was 
whether the monthly service charge was a finance charge.329  The court 
concluded that the 1.5% monthly service charge was not a finance 
charge but rather a late payment charge.330  The court construed the 
contract between the parties to mean that payment was to be made 
“within thirty days of the installation of the fireplaces with the 1.5% 
monthly charge intended to dissuade late payment.”331  Further, the 
court took note of the fact that the merchant considered the customer’s 
account to be in default upon failure to make the payment after the 
thirty days.332 
III. CONCLUSION 
It is difficult to determine whether a particular consumer transaction 
is one that is subject to the requirements of the WCA.  The transaction 
must be a consumer credit transaction.  A consumer credit transaction 
has six independent elements and each one must be satisfied.  Each 
element has its own unique litigation points.  The first element is a 
consumer transaction, which requires a customer and an agreement 
between them.  The second element is the customer, which requires the 
consumer to establish the transaction was for personal, family, or 
household purposes.  This issue essentially becomes whether the 
transaction was a personal or business transaction.  The courts are split 
 
325. Id. at *6. 
326. Alaskan Fireplace, Inc. v. Everett, No. 02-3016-FT, 2003 WL 21397747 (Wis. Ct. 
App. June 18, 2003).  
327. Id. at *1. 
328. Id. 
329. Id. (“The Everetts counterclaimed alleging that Alaskan Fireplace violated the 
WCA . . . by ‘falsely advertising (through omission) that the agreement for purchase of the 
fireplace and installation services would subject defendants to a finance charge.’”). 
330. Id. at *4. 
331. Id. at *1. 
332. Id. at *5. 
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on how to make that determination.  The third element is the merchant, 
which is much different than the merchant definition under the UCC.  
The fourth element is that the subject matter of the contract must be 
real or personal property, services, or money.  Unfortunately, the courts 
have not adopted a useful rule for distinguishing the type of services 
subject to the WCA.  The fifth element requires an extension of credit 
by the merchant.  There are a number of useful principles that can be 
extracted from the cases when analyzing this element, including the fact 
that the courts use an objective test in making a final decision.  Finally, 
the last element requires proof that the customer’s obligation is either 
payable in installments or subject to a finance charge.  The courts 
analyze a number of factors in deciding whether the merchant granted 
the customer the right to pay in installments.  The finance charge 
element requires a determination of whether the charge is a finance 
charge, a late–payment fee, or an additional charge.  Each charge has 
unique characteristics that distinguish it from the others. 
